Which causal structures might support a quantum-classical gap? by Pienaar, Jacques
Which causal structures might support a quantum-classical gap?
Jacques Pienaar∗
Faculty of Physics, University of Vienna, Boltzmanngasse 5, A-1090 Vienna, Austria. and
Institute of Quantum Optics and Quantum Information,
Austrian Academy of Sciences, Boltzmanngasse 3, A-1090 Vienna, Austria.
A causal scenario is a graph that describes the cause and effect relationships between all relevant
variables in an experiment. A scenario is deemed ‘not interesting’ if there is no device-independent
way to distinguish the predictions of classical physics from any generalised probabilistic theory
(including quantum mechanics). Conversely, an interesting scenario is one in which there exists a
gap between the predictions of different operational probabilistic theories, as occurs for example
in Bell-type experiments. Henson, Lal and Pusey (HLP) recently proposed a sufficient condition
for a causal scenario to not be interesting. In this paper we supplement their analysis with some
new techniques and results. We first show that existing graphical techniques due to Evans can
be used to confirm by inspection that many graphs are interesting without having to explicitly
search for inequality violations. For three exceptional cases – the graphs numbered #15, 16, 20 in
HLP – we show that there exist non-Shannon type entropic inequalities that imply these graphs
are interesting. In doing so, we find that existing methods of entropic inequalities can be greatly
enhanced by conditioning on the specific values of certain variables.
I. INTRODUCTION
Every physical experiment has an underlying causal
structure, conceived of as a series of events, and the
influences they have on each other. Just as trees look
much the same when stripped of their leaves, it is possi-
ble for experimental set-ups in widely differing contexts
to nevertheless exhibit the same causal structure. Causal
structure is a useful abstraction that permits us to clas-
sify experiments by their cause-and-effect relationships,
ignoring the unnecessary details of their physical imple-
mentation.
In this spirit, even a complicated physical system has a
simple representation in terms of a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) describing its causal structure, like that of the bi-
cycle shown in Fig 1. In this graph (called the causal
graph), the triangular nodes represent the minimal set of
observed events that are needed to describe the outcomes
of experimental probing of the bicycle. Circular nodes
represent unobserved variables, which are not directly
measured but can affect the observed outcomes. The
arrows indicate direct causal influences between events.
The probabilities for the values of observed variables are
governed by a set of functions relating each variable to
its direct causes in the graph; these functions are called
the model parameters. A causal graph dressed with a set
of model parameters is called a causal model [1, 2].
Following Ref. [3], a causal graph containing both
observed and unobserved nodes is called a generalized
DAG (GDAG). In general, the unobserved variables in a
GDAG can represent other objects besides random vari-
ables, such as quantum states or even ‘black boxes’ from
some hypothetical theory beyond quantum mechanics.
Traditionally, however, the unobserved nodes are just
∗ jacques.pienaar@zoho.com
random variables whose values are marginalised (summed
over), in which case they are called latent variables. In
this case, the causal model is called classical.
FIG. 1. A causal graph describing the functioning of a bicy-
cle. The gear settings G (including brakes) and the pedalling
speed P influence the acceleration vector B of the back wheel,
via the tension T in the wire cables and in the bicycle chain.
Since the tension is not directly visible to the eye, we consider
it a latent variable (hence it is represented by a circular node).
The handlebar position H influences the direction of B indi-
rectly, via its influence on the front wheel orientation F . The
direct influence of F on B is made possible by the frame of
the bicycle. The seat elevation E is causally unrelated to the
other variables, so is represented by an isolated node (such
nodes are usually omitted from the graph as irrelevant).
What are causal models good for? A typical scien-
tific experiment consists of observing some phenomenon
in the laboratory under controlled and repeatable condi-
tions, and then asking whether the probability distribu-
tion of the observed events has an explanation in terms of
some known physical theory. A causal model provides us
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2with a formal definition of explanation. If we can find a
causal model that reproduces the observed probabilities,
then we say that the observed phenomenon can be ex-
plained by the model. Hypothesis testing then becomes
the work of designing experiments to rule out different
competing explanations.
The literature on causal inference provides numerous
tools for deciding when one causal model is a better
explanation than another. In general, simpler explana-
tions are preferable to more complex ones. Explanations
should be faithful, meaning (roughly) that the observed
independencies appear in almost all causal models that
have the same causal structure as the chosen explanation.
If these principles are not enough to differentiate different
hypotheses, it is always possible to do so by performing
experimental interventions: actively changing the values
of some variables and observing the reaction of the re-
maining variables. A tool of causal inference called the
do-calculus tells us which interventions are needed to ob-
tain specific information about the causal structure.
The question arises as to whether certain experiments
in quantum physics, particularly the so-called ‘Bell-type’
experiments [4–6], can be explained by a causal model.
It is widely agreed that any explanation of quantum phe-
nomena in terms of a classical causal model must violate
at least one of several assumptions that hold for purely
classical phenomena. For example, a classical causal
model can explain quantum phenomena if we allow causes
to propagate faster than light, as in Bohmian mechanics
[7], or if we allow measurement settings to be influenced
by a hidden common cause (the super-determinism loop-
hole), and there are many other options. A more recent
perspective due to Wood & Spekkens is that classical
causal explanations of quantum experiments cannot be
faithful [8], i.e. the causal model is not a generic exam-
ple of the set of models that share its causal structure.
An alternative to the above options is to reject classical
causal models as explanations for quantum phenomena,
and to seek a more general notion of a quantum causal
model. Such a model would ideally provide a faithful ac-
count of quantum phenomena and enable causal inference
in the quantum domain [9–13].
Going a step further, Henson, Lal and Pusey (HLP) [3]
have shown that it is possible to define yet more general
causal models than quantum causal models. One can
consider a causal explanation in terms of any hypotheti-
cal generalised probabilistic theory (GPT), of which clas-
sical and quantum causal models are just special cases.
The key to the generalisation lies in the way we interpret
unobserved nodes. For a classical causal model, an un-
observed node is a latent variable; in a quantum causal
model, it represents a quantum resource, such as an en-
tangled state; more generally, it represents a ‘black box’
resource of some GPT.
The recognition that different laws of physics necessi-
tate different frameworks for causal inference leads to the
conclusion that what constitutes an explanation depends
on what model of the physical world we choose to take as
primitive. It is especially interesting to ask whether, in
an experiment whose causal structure is given, there exist
differences between the probability distributions that can
be explained by different physical models. An example
is the causal structure of Bell-type experiments, shown
in Fig. 2: if this GDAG is dressed with classical model
parameters, the probability distributions satisfy Bell in-
equalities; if we use quantum model parameters, the dis-
tributions satisfy the weaker Tsirelson’s bound [14]; and
if we use a GPT that allows Popescu-Rohrlich boxes[15],
the only relevant bound is the no-signalling constraint.
FIG. 2. A causal graph describing a generic Bell-type experi-
ment, in which a single source produces pairs of particles that
are sent to a pair of detectors. A and B are the settings of
measurements on each particle, and X,Y are the respective
outcomes. These outcomes are influenced by the unobserved
node U , typically interpreted as the state of the physical par-
ticles produced by the source. This state could be a latent
random variable in the classical case (like the state of the bi-
cycle chain in Fig. 1 ), but it could also represent a quantum
state or a generalized probabilistic resource like a ‘PR-box’ [3].
The fact that this same causal graph supports differ-
ent sets of observed probabilities means that experiments
within this causal structure can be used to perform in-
ference on the laws of physics themselves. In effect, by
assuming that the causal structure has a given form, we
are able to distinguish different physical theories within
that structure. This is, after all, precisely why Bell-type
experiments are commonly interpreted as ruling out clas-
sical physics (i.e. a faithful classical causal model) in
favour of quantum mechanics. If a resource were ever
discovered that could violate Tsirelson’s bound in a Bell-
type experiment, this would in turn constitute evidence
against the general validity of quantum mechanics. For
this reason, the causal graph of this experiment (called
the Bell scenario) is considered to be ‘interesting’.
Following this intuition, HLP gave a precise meaning
to the term interesting as a formal property of a causal
graph (we review their definition in the next section).
Not every causal graph is interesting in the sense of HLP’s
definition. Trivial examples include DAGs in which all
variables are observed (these always have a classical ex-
planation), or GDAGs in which all variables share a sin-
3gle common cause (an example of superdeterminism). A
less trivial example is the so-called ‘one-sided Bell sce-
nario’ (see Fig. 3), in which one of the measurements
is fixed (hence not a random variable). In this case, al-
though there is a non-trivial no-signalling constraint im-
posed by the causal structure (A cannot send signals to
Y ), it turns out that all possible observed probability dis-
tributions can be faithfully reproduced by some choice of
classical model parameters. We refer to causal structures
like this one as uninteresting, because experiments based
on them have no hope of differentiating between classical,
quantum or supra-quantum theories.
FIG. 3. A causal graph describing a ‘one-sided’ Bell-type
experiment. Only one measurement setting A is freely cho-
sen; the other setting is fixed to a particular value and so is
not shown in the graph. The graph is uninteresting, because
it allows a classical explanation regardless of the underlying
physical theory. This is also true for variations of the scenario
in which the value of B changes in each run but is not ‘freely
chosen’; see for example Fig.26(a) in Ref.[8].
The question now arises how to decide whether a given
causal graph is uninteresting or interesting. In their pa-
per, HLP introduced a sufficient criterion for a graph to
be uninteresting, and conjectured its necessity as well.
To provide evidence for this conjecture, they tried to
show explicitly that graphs failing their criterion must
be interesting, i.e. must allow probability distributions
not achievable by any classical causal model. They were
able to do this for almost all graphs of up to six nodes.
Only three graphs, labelled # 15,16,20 (see Fig. 7), re-
sisted both the sufficient criterion for un-interestingness
and the authors’ attempts to find any interesting proba-
bility distributions on the graphs. A main result of the
present paper is to resolve this impasse.
The method used by HLP to demonstrate interesting-
ness is somewhat tedious, as it requires identifying an
explicit constraint (eg. an entropic constraint or alge-
braic inequality) and then showing that the constraint
does not follow from the causal structure alone. Often
the best way to achieve this is to find a counterexample
– a distribution that violates the constraint in question
while satisfying all the causal constraints – but this re-
quires performing an explicit search of the probability
space. In this paper, we show that this tedious process
can sometimes be sidestepped using known techniques
from the literature, which allow interestingness to be as-
certained just by inspecting the graph.
Unfortunately, these techniques do not help us in the
case of graphs # 15,16,20, and we are ultimately forced
to derive a new kind of inequality for these graphs, which
can then be violated by an appropriately defined proba-
bility distribution in order to establish their interesting-
ness. Although tedious, this method reveals a new class
of fine-grained inequalities of non-Shannon type. These
inequalities show some promise for being generalized to
more complicated scenarios.
The paper is organised as follows. Sec. II contains
essential notation and background. We then show in
Sec. III that some simple graphical methods due to
Evans[16, 17] can be used to confirm the interestingness
of a graph by inspection. To illustrate the usefulness of
this method, we apply it to the graphs considered by HLP
and confirm their results. The only cases that do not sat-
isfy Evan’s sufficient criteria for interestingness are the
Bell and Triangle scenarios, and the graphs # 15,16,21.
For the latter three, in Sec. IV we propose a novel exten-
sion of the methods of entropic inequalities [18–20] that
confirms these graphs as interesting (and thereby com-
pletes the establishment of HLP’s conjecture for graphs
with up to six nodes). Sec. V contains our conclusions
and outlook.
II. DEFINITIONS AND STATEMENT OF THE
PROBLEM
In this section we review notation and definitions that
will be used in this paper. We refer the reader to Refs.
[1, 2] for background on causal models, and to Refs. [18–
21] for background on entropic bounds for causal graphs
relevant to this paper.
In this work, we are concerned with joint probability
distributions P (A,B,C...) of random variables denoted
by capital Roman letters A,B,C, .... Sets of random
variables will also be denoted by capital Roman letters;
the context will make it clear whether a letter refers
to a single variable or a set of variables. For expres-
sions involving set unions, we omit the ‘∪’, for exam-
ple XY := X ∪ Y is understood. Each variable takes
values in a discrete, finite set. Whenever we need to
make specific reference to them, we take these values
to be positive integers. When talking about a specific
joint probability distribution, eg. P (X,Y, Z), we will
often represent the marginal distributions of P simply
by omitting the relevant variables from P ’s domain; eg.
P (X) :=
∑
Y,Z P (X,Y, Z). A conditional probability,
denoted P (X|Y ) for disjoint sets of variables X,Y , de-
fines a family of probability distributions on the domain
of X, parametrized by the discrete index Y . Thus, for
example, P (X|Y = 1) and P (X|Y = 3) are two different
4distributions of the variable X, both belonging to the
parametrized family of distributions P (X|Y ). The law
of total probability relates all these concepts in a simple
equation: P (X,Y ) = P (X|Y )P (Y ).
There are two key properties of joint probability
distributions that can be used to characterise them: the
conditional independence (CI) relations between vari-
ables, and the entropic relations between the variables.
We discuss each of these in turn.
Definition 1: CI relations Let X,Y, Z be
three disjoint sets of variables with joint distribution
P (X,Y, Z). The sets X and Y are said to be condi-
tionally independent given Z, denoted (X ⊥ Y |Z), iff
P (X|Y,Z) = P (X|Z).
Informally, this means that learning the value of Y
provides no new information about the value of X if we
already know the value of Z. Given a distribution P (V )
on a set of variables V , the set denoted CIP (V ) con-
tains all conditional independence relations that hold in
P between all disjoint subsets of V . Any set of CI rela-
tions implies further CI relations via the semi-graphoid
axioms, which are in turn derivable from the axioms of
probability theory. We do not reproduce these here as
we will not require them explicitly. A set of CI relations
is called complete iff it is closed under the semi-graphoid
axioms. Unless stated otherwise, all sets of CI relations
referred to in this paper are assumed to be complete.
Of particular interest are those complete sets of CI
relations that can be represented by a DAG, where each
node in the DAG represents a variable. Representation
means that the CI relations are obtained from the graph
using a criterion called d-separation:
Definition 2: d-separation Given a DAG for a
set of variables V , two disjoint subsets of variables X
and Y are said to be d-separated by a third disjoint set
Z, denoted (X ⊥ Y |Z)d, iff all undirected paths (i.e.
ignoring the direction of arrows) from X to Y are blocked
by a member of Z. A path is blocked by a member of Z
iff:
(i) the path contains a chain i → m → j or a fork
i← m→ j such that the middle node m is in Z; or
(ii) the path contains a collider i → m ← j such that
the node m and its descendants are not in Z.
If a path is not blocked, it is said to be unblocked. If there
is no path connecting two nodes, as in a disconnected
graph, they are trivially d-separated by all other subsets
of nodes.
By imposing a correspondence between d-separation
and CI relations, (X ⊥ Y |Z)d ⇒ (X ⊥ Y |Z), every
DAG G(V ) implies a complete set of CI relations on the
variables V , denoted CIG(V ).
The link between CI relations and causal models is as
follows: a causal model is regarded as a possible expla-
nation of a distribution P (V ) if the set of CI relations
CIG(V ) obtained from the model’s DAG are a subset of
the set CIP (V ). More generally, we might regard P (V )
as the marginal of an unknown distribution P (V,U) and
seek an explanation in terms of a GDAG G(V,U) that
includes latent variables U . In this case consistency re-
quires that the subset of CI relations CIG(V ) (i.e. re-
stricted to the observed variables V ) should be a subset
of the CI relations in the marginal CIP (V ).
Since our main goal in this work is to classify the pos-
sible distributions that can arise from a given GDAG
ignoring interventions, we do not review the details of
causal inference, although we refer to it in passing in
Sec. IV.
We now turn to a different property of probability dis-
tributions: the entropic constraints between variables.
Given any set of variables X distributed by P (X), we
can associate an entropy, H(X). A common example is
the Shannon entropy [22] defined by:
H(X) := −
∑
X
P (X)log2 [P (X)] , (1)
where the sum is over the values of all variables in X.
Given an entropy function, it is also useful to define the
conditional mutual information of X and Y conditional
on Z as:
I(X : Y |Z) := H(XZ) +H(Y Z)−H(XY Z)−H(Z) .
Intuitively, this tells us how much the variables X and
Y are correlated, conditional on the value of Z. The
connection to CI relations is that the causal constraint
(X ⊥ Y |Z) is equivalent to the entropic constraint I(X :
Y |Z) = 0.
Unless otherwise specified, the results in this work ap-
ply to any entropy function that satisfies the polyma-
troidal axioms (also called elementary inequalities, these
are standard in information theory – see eg. Ref. [23]).
Let V denote a set of variables, X ⊆ V an arbitrary
subset, and A,B specific variables in V . Then these in-
equalities are:
H(V \A) ≤ H(V ) , ∀A ∈ V ;
H(X) +H(XAB) ≤ H(XA) +H(XB) , ∀(A 6= B) ∈ V \X;
H(∅) = 0 .
(2)
Any inequality that follows from these is called a
Shannon-type inequality. Given a set of variables V dis-
tributed by P (V ), an entropy function assigns a real
value ≥ 0 to all subsets of V . If we regard each sub-
set as the basis of an abstract vector space, then the
entropy function maps the distribution P to a vector in
this space; the set of all such vectors (corresponding to
valid probability distributions) defines a convex cone. An
explicit characterization of this cone has not been found
to date. However, since all valid entropy functions must
satisfy the inequalities (2), these define an outer approx-
imation called the Shannon cone. The entropy vector of
any valid distribution P (V ) must lie within this cone,
5but the converse is not true – there are sometimes dis-
tributions that satisfy all Shannon-type inequalities but
cannot be obtained as the marginal of a valid probability
distribution on V .
We are now in a position to formally state the problem
of whether or not a GDAG is interesting. Let G(V,U) be
a GDAG with observed variables V and unobserved vari-
ables U . We are concerned with the question of whether
all distributions P (V ) that respect the causal structure
of G can arise as the marginal distribution of a classi-
cal causal model. Following HLP, let I be the set of
distributions P (V ) that respect the observable indepen-
dencies implied by G, i.e. such that CIG(V ) ⊆ CIP (V ).
Next, define C as the set of distributions P (V ) that are
marginals of some probability distribution P (V,U) hav-
ing CIG(V,U) ⊆ CIP (V,U). Since the latter condition is
strictly stronger, we have C ⊆ I, and the graph is called
interesting if and only if the inclusion is strict, C 6= I
(otherwise it is uninteresting). Note that a difference be-
tween these sets indicates the existence of constraints on
C that can be violated by distributions in I. Thus, a
sufficient condition to show that a GDAG is interesting
is to identify a constraint in C that does not apply in I.
This can be established in two ways: (i) the constraint
can be proven not to follow from the contraints that de-
fine the set I, or (ii) the constraint can be shown to be
violated by a specific distribution in I. The first method
is simplest (when it applies) and can be done by purely
graphical techniques, some of which are reviewed in the
next section. The second method requires searching the
probability space of I for suitable counterexamples, but
can succeed in many cases where the first method fails;
in Sec IV we employ this method using what we call ‘fine
grained’ inequalities.
III. THE SKELETON METHOD AND
E-SEPARATION
In this section, we review two graphical techniques pro-
posed by Evans for identifying cases where C ( I, that is,
for identifying graphs as interesting. The first technique
is called the Skeleton method, and the second is called e-
separation. As we will see, these are not independent; the
Skeleton method derives from a corollary of e-separation
and is easier to understand and use. For graphs larger
than 7 nodes, however, we argue that e-separation is the
more general and more useful method.
We begin with some useful definitions adapted from
Refs. [16, 17]. Where our terminology differs from that
of Evans, a translation is provided in the footnotes.
In what follows, G(V,U) is a GDAG with observed
variables V and unobserved variables U .
Definition 3: hidden paths and causes.
Let X,Y be any specific variables in G. A directed
path from X to Y is called a hidden path iff it contains
more than one arrow and all nodes on the path besides
X,Y are in U (i.e. unobserved). Two variables X,Y
are said to share a hidden common cause iff they share
an unobserved common ancestor W ∈ U to which they
are either directly connected, or connected by a hidden
path. (Note: a variable is not considered to be an
ancestor of itself). For example, in Fig. 4 (a), the node
B is a hidden common cause of the nodes E and C.
Definition 4: maximal connected subsets [24].
In the GDAG G(V,U), a subset of observed variables
B ∈ V is called connected iff all nodes in B share a
single hidden common cause. A connected set B is called
maximal iff there is no other connected set that fully
contains it. Let BG(V ) denote the set of all maximal
connected subsets (of size ≥ 2) in G. For example,
in Fig. 4 (a), the sets {E,C}, {C,G} are connected
subsets, and {C,D,E,G} is the only non-trivial maximal
connected subset.
Definition 5: canonical GDAG [25] .
Given the GDAG G(V,U), define its canonical projection
G′(V,W ) as follows:
(i) The observed nodes of G′ are the same as those in G.
(ii) Two observed nodes X,Y are connected by an arrow
X → Y in G′ iff they are connected by an arrow or a
hidden path in G.
(iii) There is one unobserved node in W for each
maximal connected subset of G, and each node in W is
a direct cause of all nodes in the corresponding element
of B ∈ BG(V ).
Fig. 4 shows an example of the canonical projection of
a GDAG. A GDAG is said to be canonical iff it is equal
to its own canonical projection.
FIG. 4. Canonical projection of a GDAG. (a) shows the
original GDAG, whose only maximal subset of size ≥ 2 is
{C,D,E,G} (highlighted). (b) is the corresponding canoni-
cal GDAG. By definition, both have the same skeleton, shown
in (c). This example is taken from Evans [17].
As shown by Evans (see Proposition 4.9(b) and The-
orem 4.13 in Ref. [17]), every GDAG is observationally
equivalent to its canonical projection, in the sense that
6they have the same set of possible marginal distributions
P (V ) on the observed variables.
Definition 6: GDAG skeleton.
Let G(V,U) be a canonical GDAG with maximal con-
nected subsets B. The skeleton of G is defined to be an
undirected graph having nodes V , and where two nodes
are connected iff they are connected by an arrow in
G, or belong to the same maximal connected subset in B.
(If G is not canonical, we define its skeleton to be
the skeleton of its associated canonical GDAG). For
example, Fig. 5 (a,b) shows two GDAGs with their
corresponding skeletons underneath. We can now
introduce the Skeleton method:
Theorem 1: The Skeleton method.
Consider a GDAG G(V,U). Let K(V,W ) be a GDAG
with the same set of observable variables V and observ-
able CI relations CIG(V ), but for which it is known that
C = I (assuming such a GDAG can be found). Suppose
furthermore that the skeletons of G and K are different.
Then C ( I for G.
The proof follows from Proposition 6.5 in Ref. [17],
which states that the observed marginals of G and K
are different if they have different skeletons. Since they
have the same set of observable variables and observable
CI relations, the set I is the same for both graphs, and
since C = I for K, it follows that C ( I for G. 
This method is useful for GDAGs having few or no
observed CI relations, where a suitable GDAG K is easy
to find. For instance, if CIG(V ) = ∅, one can always
take K(V ) to be a maximally connected DAG. It is
likely to become increasingly difficult to find a suitable
graph K with which to apply the Skeleton method for
large numbers of variables; nevertheless the method
works well for small GDAGs. Fig. 5 shows how it can
be applied to graph #21 from Ref. [3], and the reader
is encouraged to verify that the same method can be
used to establish the interestingness of most of the
other graphs considered by those authors. The notable
exceptions are #2 (the Bell scenario), #8 (the Triangle
scenario), and #15,16,20 which we consider in Sec. IV.
For the Bell scenario, the method fails because there is
no graph K that satisfies the no-signalling constraint
and has C = I, while for the Triangle scenario it fails
because the skeleton of all candidate K graphs is the
same as that of G. For #15,16,20, the situation is
analagous to the Bell scenario: for each one, there is no
graph K that satisfies the same observed CI relations
yet has a different skeleton.
We now discuss a second graphical method based on
the idea of ‘extended d-separation’, or e-separation in
Evans [16].
FIG. 5. Application of the Skeleton method to graph #21
from HLP. The original GDAG and its skeleton are shown in
(a). Since the graph has no observable conditional indepen-
dencies, a candidate for the comparison graph K is a complete
graph, like the one shown in (b). Since its skeleton is different,
Theorem 1 implies the original graph is interesting.
Definition 7: e-separation.
Let X,Y, Z,W be four disjoint sets of variables in a
DAG. Suppose that, after removing the nodes W from
the graph, the sets X and Y are d-separated by the set
Z in the new graph. Then we say that ‘X and Y are
e-separated by Z after deletion of W ’.
In the above definition, the new graph produced ‘after
removal of the nodes W ’ is to be understood formally
as the induced subgraph of the original graph on the
complement of W , that is, the graph consisting of the
nodes not in W , and the edges connecting these nodes
that do not have endpoints in W .
Notice that e-separation is a relation between four
sets of nodes, and it reduces to the three-set criterion
of d-separation when W = ∅. Evans showed that,
under certain conditions, e-separation implies an extra
constraint on the set of observed classical distributions C.
To explain this constraint, we need one more definition:
Definition 8: compatibility along a section.
Let P (W,X, ...) and P ∗(W,X, ...) be two different
probability distributions on the same set of variables.
If they take the same values whenever the variables W
are fixed to a particular set of values W = w (i.e. if
P (W,X, ...) δ(W,w) = P ∗(W,X, ...) δ(W,w)) then we
say that P and P ∗ are compatible along the section W=w.
We can now describe the constraint that is implied by
e-separation:
Theorem 9: e-separation constraint.
Let P (X,Y, Z,W, ...) be any distribution in C for a
DAG G. Suppose that X and Y are e-separated by
Z after deletion of W , and that no member of Z is
7descended from W . Then for each possible value w of W ,
the conditional distribution P (X,Y,W, ...|Z) must be
compatible along the section W = w with a distribution
P (w)(X,Y,W, ...|Z) in which (X ⊥ Y |Z) holds.
The proof of this constraint on C is derived in Theo-
rem 4.2 in Ref. [16]. The question remains under what
circumstances it represents a constraint on I as well. To
answer this, we require the following Lemma:
Lemma 2: Conditions for e-separation to
imply C 6= I.
Let G(U, V ) be a GDAG in which {X,Y, Z,W} ⊆ V are
disjoint subsets of observed nodes, such that no member
of Z is descended from W and X and Y are e-separated
by Z after deletion of W . Then C 6= I for G if and only
if the observed CI relations CIG(V ) exclude all relations
of the form (X ⊥ Y |ZS), where S is any subset of W .
Proof: First, we prove the ‘only if’ clause by show-
ing that if any relation (X ⊥ Y |ZS) does hold, then
the e-separation constraint follows from the constraints
CIG(V ) alone. Let W = S ∪ T , and let W take pos-
sible values w = {s, t}. Suppose that (X ⊥ Y |ZS)
holds in CIG(V ). For each {s, t} we can then de-
fine P (s,t)(X,Y, Z, S, T, ...) := P (X,Y, T, Z...|S) δ(S, s).
Since (X ⊥ Y |ZS) necessarily holds in P , (X ⊥ Y |Z)
necessarily holds in P (s,t)(X,Y, S, T, ...|Z). Moreover,
each P (s,t) satisfies
P (s,t)(X,Y, S, T, ...|Z) δ(S, s) δ(T, t) = (3)
P (X,Y, T, ...|ZS) δ(S, s) δ(T, t) ,
hence P (s,t) is compatible with P along the section ST =
{s, t} after conditioning on Z. Therefore, the presence of
(X ⊥ Y |ZS) in CIG is sufficient to imply the e-separation
constraint of Theorem 9.
Next, we prove the ‘if’ clause by explicitly constructing
a distribution P ′ that satisfies CIG(V ) (and is therefore
in I) but cannot satisfy the e-separation constraint.
Consider the distribution P ′(X,Y, Z, S, T...) in which
X,Y are perfectly correlated (and take more than one
value) and every other variable is fixed to a single value.
(Note that this distribution is only possible if CIG(V )
excludes all relations of the form (X ⊥ Y |ZS), otherwise
it is not a valid distribution for the GDAG G). We then
find that there is only a single pair of values {s, t} for
which P ′ is non-vanishing, which means that P ′ is equal
to its own “section”, P ′ = P ′ δ(S, s) δ(T, t). Moreover,
the only normalized probability distribution that is
compatible with P ′ along this section is P ′ itself, hence
we must have P (s,t) := P ′. But this means X,Y are
necessarily correlated in P (s,t) conditional on Z, so the
e-separation constraint is impossible to satisfy for the
distribution P ′. 
These observations mean that, for a given graph, we
can tell whether the e-separation constraint holds in I
or not, and hence whether a graph is interesting:
Theorem 3 : The e-separation method.
Consider a GDAG G with observed CI relations CIG(V ).
Let X,Y, Z,W be disjoint sets of observable nodes, such
that no member of Z is descended from W in the graph.
Then if X and Y are e-separated by Z after deletion of
W , and if CIG(V ) excludes (X ⊥ Y |ZS) for all subsets
S ⊆W , then C ( I for G.
The proof follows from Theorem 4.2 in Ref. [16], and
our Lemma 2. Note that in the cases where C ( I,
the Lemma also tells us how to explicitly construct a
distribution that violates the e-separation constraint:
simply have X,Y perfectly correlated and all other
variables fixed.
Fig. 6 shows how to apply the e-separation method to
GDAG # 17. In this graph, F,D,C,E correspond re-
spectively to the sets {X,Y, Z,W} in Theorem 3, and F
and D are e-separated by C after deletion of E. This
means (F ⊥ D|C) holds in the graph after deletion,
Fig. 6 (b), but notice that neither (F ⊥ D|C) nor
(F ⊥ D|CE) holds in the original graph Fig. 6 (a). (To
see this, observe that the path F ← E ← D is unblocked
if we condition only on C, but if we condition on both C
and E, then another path F ← A → C ← B → E ← D
becomes unblocked). Hence the conditions of Theorem 3
are met and the graph must be interesting.
Note that instead of (F ⊥ D|C), we could alterna-
tively have used the CI relation (F ⊥ D), i.e. taking the
conditioned set Z to be the empty set. On the other
hand, we could not have deleted C and used the resulting
relation (F ⊥ D|E) to invoke E-separation, because
E is descended from C, violating a premise of Theorem 3.
FIG. 6. Application of the E-separation method to graph
#17 from HLP. The original GDAG is shown in (a), while (b)
shows the GDAG after deleting E and its edges. Note that C
is not descended from E; also the CI relation (F ⊥ D|C) holds
in (b) but neither it nor (F ⊥ D|CE) holds in CIG. Theorem
3 can then be applied to show the graph is interesting, if we
identify {F,D,C,E} respectively with the sets {X,Y, Z,W}
in the Theorem.
The e-separation method is based on Theorem 4.2 in
Ref. [16], of which Proposition 6.5 in Ref. [17] (the basis
for the Skeleton method) is a Corollary. We therefore
8expect the e-separation method to succeed in at least
those cases where the Skeleton method succeeded (and
possibly more). In the Appendix, we present a GDAG
of eight nodes whose interestingness can be proven by
e-separation, but cannot be proven by the Skeleton
method, thereby demonstrating that e-separation is a
strictly more useful criterion.
For GDAGs of up to six nodes, we find the e-separation
method has the same success as the Skeleton method:
the reader is encouraged to verify that it confirms the
interestingness of all GDAGs considered by HLP except
the Bell scenario, the Triangle scenario, and the three
GDAGs #15,16,20.
It fails for the Bell scenario because there is no way to
delete any observed nodes to create a CI relation that is
not already implied by CIG(V ). The Triangle scenario
has a similar problem: to avoid triviality, one can only
delete a single node, but then the remaining two nodes
will still be correlated, i.e. no new observable CI relations
are implied. The method fails for graphs # 15,16,20,
because the only viable candidates for the sets X,Y in
Theorem 3 either cannot be d-separated by the deletion
of other observed nodes (as in # 16), or the deletion of
any candidate node does not result in new CI relations
(as in # 15, 20).
Remark 1: In the cases of up to six nodes where
the technique does work, the distribution that vio-
lates the e-separation constraint is the same distribution
that HLP found to violate a relevant Shannon-type en-
tropic inequality. This indicates that whenever the e-
separation constraint applies, there may exist a corre-
sponding Shannon-type entropic inequality.
Remark 2: In the Appendix we present a graph of
8 nodes that e-separation identifies as interesting, but
where the Skeleton method fails to apply. This indicates
that, for larger DAGs, e-separation is strictly more pow-
erful than the Skeleton method.
IV. ENTROPIC INEQUALITIES VIA
‘FINE-GRAINING’
We now turn to the problem of establishing the in-
terestingness of the graphs # 15,16,20 as conjectured in
HLP (these are displayed in Fig. 7).
Let us concentrate on graph #16; the others will follow
in kind. For simplicity, we assume A is binary and takes
values in {0, 1}. Our goal is to demonstrate that the
observed marginal of this graph is subject to an entropic
constraint, namely:
I(E : D|Aˆ0)− I(F : D|Aˆ0)
+ I(F : D|Aˆ1)− I(E : D|Aˆ1) ≤ H(D) ,
(4)
where the notation Aˆ0 means do(A = 0), i.e. ‘in-
tervene on A and set it to 0’ . Thus, for example,
FIG. 7. The causal graphs #15,16,20 from HLP, with ob-
served CI relations written below. These do not satisfy HLPs’
sufficient condition for uninterestingness, but they also resist
Evans’ sufficient criteria for interestingness. We find a proba-
bility distribution that violates the ‘fine-grained’ entropic in-
equality (4), thereby confirming that these graphs are indeed
interesting.
.
I(E : D|Aˆ0) is the mutual information of E,D in the
post-intervention distribution P (E,D|Aˆ0). The reader
might object that, if we cannot perform interventions,
then we cannot obtain the quantities appearing on the
left hand side of the inequality (4). In fact, we can obtain
these quantities without doing an intervention, because
A is an exogenous node in the graph (it has no parents).
Hence the following identity holds:
P (E,D|Aˆ0) = P (E,D|A) δ(A,0) , (5)
where δ(A,0) is a Kronecker delta function. Intuitively,
this says that the post-intervention distribution is the
same as the distribution obtained by post-selecting on A
having the particular value 0 or 1. We therefore have a
situation where the causal graph allows us to learn some-
thing about the post-intervention distributions without
actually performing an intervention. Whenever a con-
straint such as the inequality (4) involves these post-
intervention distributions, we call it a fine-grained con-
straint. We now establish a general framework for ob-
taining fine-grained entropic constraints from a causal
graph, and use it to derive Eqn. (4).
A. Preliminaries
Let P (R,X,Z) be a classical distribution (all variables
are observed) compatible with some DAG G(R,X,Z)
in the usual sense that CIG(R,X,Z) ⊆ CIP (R,X,Z).
Here, X,Z are specific variables, R is the set of remain-
ing variables, and Z is exogenous. Then the distribution
factorises as P (R,X,Z) = P (R,X|Z)P (Z). In the
following we assume Z is binary for clarity, but the
9results can easily be extended to the case where Z is an
arbitrary discrete variable. We give definitions for the
case Z = 0; similar definitions are understood to hold
for Z = 1.
Define the notation:
P (R,X|Zˆ0) := P (R,X|do(Z = 0)). (6)
Therefore,
P (R,X|Zˆ0) = P (R,X|Z)δ(Z,0) . (7)
For any subset of variables S (excluding Z), we define
H(S|Zˆ0) as the entropy of S with respect to the post-
intervention distribution P (S|Zˆ0):
H(S|Zˆ0) := −
∑
S
P (S|Zˆ0)log2
[
P (S|Zˆ0)
]
. (8)
Entropies of this form (pertaining to a specific value of
Z) are called ‘fine-grained’. Functions of the entropies,
like the mutual information I(X : Y |Zˆ0), are defined
analogously, using the entropies of the post-intervention
distribution. For example:
I(X : Y |Zˆ0) := H(X|Zˆ0) +H(Y |Zˆ0)−H(XY |Zˆ0) .
(9)
Any inequality that contains terms like these is said to be
‘fine-grained’. Any CI relations that hold in the original
distribution necessarily hold in the post-intervention
distribution. For example, if I(X : Y |Z) = 0 holds in
P (X,Y, Z), then the statement I(X : Y |Zˆ0) = 0 is also
valid. Moreover, we have:
Corollary 4 :
If (S ⊥ Z) holds in P (S,Z), then P (S|Zˆ0) = P (S|Zˆ1) =
P (S).
This statement is a consequence of Rule 3 in Pearl’s do
calculus (see Pearl [1], Theorem 3.4.1). It is important
because it allows us to relate the entropies of distributions
for which Z = 0 to entropies of distributions in which
Z = 1, which implies fine-grained entropic constraints.
In what follows, we only make use of Corollary 4, but
in general the entire do calculus is available for deriving
such constraints. We return to this point in Sec. IV C.
B. Derivation of the inequality
Returning to the specific case of graph #16, we aim
to prove Eqn. (4). To this end we require the following
elementary entropic inequalities:
H(DE) ≤ H(E) +H(D) , (10)
H(E) +H(CDE) ≤ H(CE) +H(DE) , (11)
H(DF ) ≤ H(F ) +H(D) , (12)
H(F ) +H(BDF ) ≤ H(BF ) +H(DF ) , (13)
H(D) +H(BCD) ≤ H(CD) +H(BD) , (14)
as well as the CI relations:
(D ⊥ E|CA) , (15)
(D ⊥ F |BA) , (16)
(BCD ⊥ A) , (17)
(B ⊥ C) , (18)
which happen to hold in all three graphs. It is useful to
define the quantities:
Q0 := H(E|Aˆ0)−H(DE|Aˆ0) ;
R0 := H(F |Aˆ0)−H(DF |Aˆ0) ;
Q1 := H(E|Aˆ1)−H(DE|Aˆ1) ;
R1 := H(F |Aˆ1)−H(DF |Aˆ1) ,
so that the LHS of (4) can be written (after expanding
and cancelling some terms) as:
LHS = Q0 −R0 +R1 −Q1 . (19)
From (11) & (15) we obtain:
H(E|Aˆ0)−H(DE|Aˆ0) ≤ H(C|Aˆ0)−H(CD|Aˆ0) ,
(20)
and from (10) we obtain:
−H(D|Aˆ1) ≤ H(E|Aˆ1)−H(DE|Aˆ1) . (21)
Similarly, from (13) & (16), and from (12) we obtain:
H(F |Aˆ1)−H(FD|Aˆ1) ≤ H(B|Aˆ1)−H(BD|Aˆ1)
−H(D|Aˆ0) ≤ H(F |Aˆ0)−H(FD|Aˆ0) .
(22)
It follows that:
Q0 ≤ H(C|Aˆ0)−H(CD|Aˆ0) ;
−R0 ≤ H(D|Aˆ0) ;
R1 ≤ H(B|Aˆ1)−H(BD|Aˆ1) ;
−Q1 ≤ H(D|Aˆ1) .
But (17) implies:
H(D|Aˆ0) = H(D|Aˆ1) = H(D) ;
H(C|Aˆ0)−H(CD|Aˆ0) = H(C)−H(DC) ;
H(B|Aˆ1)−H(BD|Aˆ1) = H(B)−H(DB) , (23)
so the upper bounds simplify to:
Q0 ≤ H(C)−H(DC) ;
−R0 ≤ H(D) ;
R1 ≤ H(B)−H(DB) ;
−Q1 ≤ H(D) .
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Combining these with (19), we find the LHS of (4) is
upper bounded by:
LHS ≤ H(B) +H(C)−H(CD)−H(BD) + 2H(D) .
(24)
Finally, using (14) and (18), this simplifies to:
LHS ≤ H(BC)−H(BCD) +H(D)
≤ H(D) , (25)
where in the last step we used the elementary inequality
H(BC) ≤ H(BCD). This completes the proof of (4). 
It follows that the entropic inequality (4) holds in
graph #16; in fact, since the CI relations used in the
proof are common to all three DAGs, the same inequality
can be shown to hold in all three. Furthermore, we now
present a probability distribution on the observed vari-
ables that satisfies all the observed CI relations of both
#15,#16 but violates this inequality. Let P˜ (A,D,E, F )
be an observed marginal distribution having the special
property that when A = 0, the bits E,D are perfectly
correlated and F is fixed to 0, whereas when A = 1 the
bits F,D are correlated and E is fixed. More formally,
P˜ satisfies:
(i) all variables are binary with values in {0, 1};
(ii) the bits A and D are random and evenly distributed;
(iii) F = A×D ;
(iv) E = (A⊕ 1)D ,
where ⊕ is addition modulo 2, and A × D means the
product of the values of A,D. Although P˜ satisfies all
of the CI relations required by the DAGs #15, 16 for
the observed variables, it violates the constraint Eqn.
(4), since (using the Shannon entropy) the LHS evalu-
ates to 2, whereas the bound H(D) for a binary variable
D is only 1. Hence P˜ (A,D,E, F ) cannot be a (classical)
marginal of the underlying DAG. The existence of this
distribution therefore establishes C ( I for #15, 16.
The case of #20 requires a little more care, because the
distribution P˜ does not satisfy the relation (F ⊥ A|E),
which holds in #20. Fortunately, a minor adjustment
of P˜ will allow us to obtain a distribution which does
the job. Consider a distribution in which we allow E to
take three possible values, E ∈ {0, 1, 2}, but all other
variables remain binary. Define the distribution P˜ ′ by
the following property: when A = 0, the bits E,D are
perfectly correlated and have values in {0, 1}, while F
is fixed to 0; when A = 1 the bits F,D are perfectly
correlated and E is fixed to the value 2. Formally:
(i) A,D,F ∈ {0, 1}, E ∈ {0, 1, 2} ;
(ii) the bits A and D are random and evenly distributed;
(iii) F = A×D ;
(iv) E = (A⊕ 1)D + 2A ,
(note that the second plus sign in (iv) is not modulo 2).
This distribution is almost identical to the previous one,
except that knowledge of the value of E is now sufficient
to deduce the value of A. This means the distribution
additionally satisfies (F ⊥ A|E), and therefore satisfies
all the observed CI relations of #20. As before, this
distribution achieves 2 on the LHS and 1 on the RHS of
Eqn. (4), violating the inequality.
Remark: One could of course have used P˜ ′ to violate
the inequality for all three graphs (since it satisfies the
CI relations of all three), eliminating the need for P˜ ;
however, we have chosen to include the latter distribution
in our discussion because, while its scope is more limited,
it is simpler in that it uses only binary variables.
In conclusion, the above distributions P˜ , P˜ ′ satisfy the
observed CI relations of #15,#16, and #20, respectively,
but violate the inequality Eqn. (4) that holds in these
graphs, establishing C ( I. This completes the missing
piece of HLP’s analysis of DAGs of up to six nodes.
C. Discussion
The previous section suggests a general approach to
finding fine-grained entropic inequalities such as Eqn.
(4). One first selects one or more exogenous nodes to
be ‘fine-grained’, which means that we specify the set of
possible values of each of these variables (eg. that they
are binary and take values in {0, 1} ). We then consider
the entropic inequalities conditioned on specific values
of the fine-grained nodes (i.e. the fine-grained versions
of the usual entropic inequalities). Corollary 4, together
with the CI relations from the graph, implies constraints
relating entropies that are fine-grained on different values
of the same variable. These constraints take the form of
inequalities like Eqn. (4). The usual methods for finding
entropic inequalities apply - the only difference is that
the set of inequalities is enlarged to include fine-grained
entropies as well as normal entropies.
The method we employed in the previous section has
the disadvantage that it still involves finding explicit in-
equalities and searching for a distribution that violates
one of them. Fortunately, Wolfe et. al. recently proposed
a convenient graphical method called the inflation DAG
technique, with which they were independently able to
establish the interestingness of GDAG #15, as well as
the Triangle and Bell scenarios[26].
The distribution P˜ described in the previous section
is notable because it does not violate any standard
Shannon-type entropic inequalities. In fact, the distri-
bution lies inside an inner approximation of the entropy
cone for scenario #15 (the author thanks Weilenmann
and Colbeck for this information [27]). This means that
no conventional entropic inequality can distinguish it
from a valid distribution for this scenario. We conclude
that fine-grained inequalities are strictly more powerful
than conventional entropic inequalities.
An interesting feature of graph #15 is that if we make
A into an unobserved variable, we recover the Trian-
gle scenario. It turns out that the marginal obtained
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by summing over A in P˜ is also incompatible with the
Triangle scenario [26]. This suggests that although the
“W-distribution” discussed in Ref. [26] lies inside an in-
ner approximation of the entropic cone for the Triangle
scenario, it might be possible to distinguish it from a
valid distribution using a fine-grained entropic inequal-
ity. However, since all observed variables in that sce-
nario have parents, this would require an extension of
the present formalism to non-exogenous nodes.
From the presentation given here, there seem to be two
obvious ways to extend the approach. The first method
is to consider fine-graining by post-selecting on the val-
ues of non-exogenous nodes. For example, we could
consider the distribution P (R,X|Z = 0) obtained from
P (R,X,Z) by post-selecting on the outcome Z = 0. In
the case where Z has parents in the DAG, the resulting
distribution is:
P (R,X|Z = 0) = P (R,X,Z) δ(Z,0)
P (Z = 0)
, (26)
i.e. the distribution of R,X conditional on Z = 0. This
can be thought of as a generalisation of the RHS of Eq.
(7) because it reduces to the same expression in the case
that Z is exogenous. We could then search for fine-
grained entropic inequalities conditioned on the values
of non-exogenous nodes.
Note that, in general, the post-selected distribution
P (R,X|Z = 0) is not the same as the post-intervention
distribution P (R,X|do(Z = 0)). This brings us to
the second possible extension, already hinted at earlier
in the paper: to use post-intervention distributions like
P (R,X|do(Z = 0)) in situations where Z is not exoge-
nous. One could then make use of the full do calculus in
order to discover new fine-grained entropic inequalities.
We leave it to future work to explore the potential of
these extensions of the fine-graining method.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The experimentally observed violation of Bell inequal-
ities brings home the remarkable fact that, if we are cer-
tain that we know the causal structure of an experimental
set-up, we can use it to make inferences about the fun-
damental laws of physics that govern the systems in the
experiment. In particular, Bell-type experiments lever-
age the causal structure of space-time to rule out any
faithful classical causal explanation of the experimental
data. More generally, it would be useful to know which
causal structures (represented by an associated GDAG)
can be utilised for this purpose.
As pointed out in HLP, a necessary first step is the
ability to identify the uninteresting graphs, which cannot
be used for distinguishing physical theories. Whereas
HLP provided a sufficient condition for uninteresting-
ness, in this paper we drew attention to some necessary
conditions due to Evans (namely, we pointed out that a
graph must be interesting if it violates Evans’ graphical
criteria reviewed in Sec. III ). Furthermore, we derived
a fine-grained entropic inequality that is able to confirm
the interestingness of graphs #15,16,20. Inequalities
of this type were shown to follow from Pearl’s do
calculus of interventions, suggesting the possibility of a
general method for deriving such inequalities in more
complicated scenarios.
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Appendix: e-separation vs. the Skeleton method
In Sec. III, it was claimed that a GDAG exists in which
e-separation could be used to determine C 6= I, but for
which the Skeleton method could not be used. Here, we
describe the GDAG and justify the claim. The GDAG is
shown in Fig. 8, and its skeleton in Fig. 9. The three CI
relations listed in Fig. 8 are a generating set for the ob-
served CI relations CIG(V ) where V := {X,Y, Z,W,A}.
The variables {U1, U2, U3} are unobserved.
FIG. 8. A graph G that is shown to be interesting via the e-
separation method, but to which one cannot apply the Skele-
ton method. The CI relations in the box generate all relevant
observed CI relations.
To begin, let us determine that the graph G is interest-
ing, according to the criteria of e-separation. Following
Theorem 3, let the sets X,Y, Z,W in the Theorem corre-
spond to X,Y, Z,W respectively in the graph. One can
check that X and Y are e-separated by Z after deletion
of W ; Z is descended from W ; and neither (X ⊥ Y |Z)
nor (X ⊥ Y |ZW ) is implied by G (using the rules of
d-separation). Thus, from Lemma 2 we have C ⊆ I for
G.
FIG. 9. The skeleton of the graph in Fig. 8 .
Next, we show that the skeleton method cannot be
used to reach the same conclusion. Specifically, we show
that there is no GDAG K whose skeleton is different to
that of G (as displayed in Fig. 9) and which satisfies
the same observed CI relations as G. First, we observe
that any candidate GDAG K cannot have chords in its
skeleton connecting the following pairs of nodes: (X,A);
(X,W ); (X,Y ); (Z,A). This is because the presence
of any one of these chords would violate an observed
CI relation in all GDAGs consistent with the skeleton.
For example, the chord (X,Y ) implies that any GDAG
with that skeleton must have either a direct cause be-
tween X,Y or else the two must share a hidden com-
mon cause; this means they cannot then be rendered
independent by conditioning on other variables, violat-
ing (X ⊥ Y |ZA). After eliminating these chords from
the skeleton, the remaining chords are (X,Z); (Z, Y );
(Z,W ); (A, Y ); (A,W ); (Y,W ). These chords are all
present in the skeleton of G, shown in Fig. 9, hence
any candidate GDAG K, to be useful for the Skeleton
method, must possess only a strict subset of these chords
in its skeleton.
We now show that removing any one of the chords
in G’s skeleton necessarily introduces a new CI relation
not implied by G. To show this, we make use of the
d-separation criterion for whether a path through the
graph is ‘unblocked’ or ‘blocked’ (recall Definition 2).
We treat each chord in turn.
Delete (X,Z): Removing this chord makes X an
isolated variable. Thus, eg. (X ⊥ Z) must hold, but this
is not implied by G. 
Delete (Z,Y): Removing this chord leaves only one
path between X and W , namely X − Z −W . In order
for the observed CI relation (X ⊥ W ) to hold, Z must
be a collider on this path. But then all paths connecting
X to Y would be blocked, implying (X ⊥ Y ), which is
not implied by G. 
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Delete (Z,W): Removing this chord leaves only one
path connecting X to Y , namely X − Z − Y . This path
cannot be blocked by A. That means (X ⊥ Y |ZA) only
holds if (X ⊥ Y |Z) holds – but while the former relation
is implied by G, the latter is not. 
Delete (A,Y): Removing this chord means that no
paths connecting X and Y contain A, so these paths
cannot be blocked by A. Thus, as in the previous case,
(X ⊥ Y |ZA) requires (X ⊥ Y |Z) to hold, but this is not
the case in G. 
Delete (A,W): Removing this chord again leaves no
path between X and Y that contains A; thus, as in the
previous two cases, (X ⊥ Y |ZA) cannot hold without
(X ⊥ Y |Z), but only the former of the two is implied by
G. 
Delete (Y,W): This case is more complicated. First,
it will be useful to establish that there is a directed path
from Z to Y that does not contain any other observed
nodes, and in addition X,Y do not share a hidden
common cause. We will indicate this by the shorthand
Z → Y (abusing notation). To prove this, note that
(X ⊥ Y |AZ) (which is implied by G) means that all
paths between X and Y are blocked by Z,A. Since the
path X − Z − Y only contains Z, this path must be
blocked by Z. This can only occur if either X ← Z, or
Z → Y , or both. However, the former can’t be the case,
since then the path X − Z − W would be unblocked,
violating (X ⊥ W ), which is implied by G. So it must
be the latter case: Z → Y .
Now, if we remove the chord (Y,W ), there are only two
paths connecting Y and W , namely W − Z − Y and
W −A−Y . In order to avoid (Y ⊥W |AZ), which is not
implied by G, we require that at least one of these paths
is unblocked conditional on AZ, hence that A and/or
Z must be a collider on its respective path. Since we
have established Z → Y , Z cannot be a collider on the
path W − Z − Y . That leaves A, but if A is a collider
on W −A−Y , then conditioning on A cannot block any
path between X and Y . But then we are in the same
position as the previous three cases: since (X ⊥ Y |AZ)
holds in G, so should (X ⊥ Y |Z), but the latter is not
implied by G. 
We have seen that no single chord can be removed from
the skeleton of G without introducing new constraints
not implied by G. However, since a CI relation cannot
be invalidated by deleting further nodes or edges from a
graph, it follows that the removal of any set of chords
from the skeleton of G will result in new CI relations not
implied by G. Together with the fact (proven above) that
no chords can be added, we conclude that the skeleton of
G is the only one that supports the exact set of observed
CI relations CIG(V ). Hence there is no GDAG K that
can be used for the purposes of the Skeleton method.
The GDAG of Fig. 8 is therefore a counterexample to the
proposition that the power of e-separation is the same as
the Skeleton method – it shows that the former method is
strictly more powerful in GDAGs of eight nodes or more.
(Whether a counterexample exists with only seven nodes
is an open problem, but I suspect the answer is negative).
